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recortled. As a wItness for the" appellant, Gaston declared
that heneve~ had. ,possessiono! it nor did 1>c knqw. of its
existence.Concerriingth,e other reco,rded,instrllIDent, Gaston
did not directly deny' that, he signed a deed to Ta:Ylo~. He
a~niltted that he signed ,isome' document' 'while in the office
of Miss PattIson. '
also said the document "iitay have
been:;
a deed"
'that'while
he was there; on(j,ormore
.
. , and' "
.....,
docmnents were handed hack and forth between him and
Mr. Taylor and Mfss :r,aulson.
From 'this and the other ,evidence the trial ,court might
have found ihatGaston delivered his deed to Taylor at ,the
time he,~igriedan~aGknowledge4 itwitl{the inte;nt~o~th~t
it shoUld, convey tItle. And M:r!!; Marlenee's admI~~Qn that
she "a;rrilnged :with ,T. 0 . , Taylor 'to takethetitle'in his
own 'nanie, thiough ,Gaston, hold it as long as he ¢oul~,~', and,'
then, seU it riertaiD.ly iInports ,a full intention, that Gaston
should. obtain ' a.' merchantable title. Under these CIrCumst~l1ce~ there .was a 'leg~ldeli~~ry of her deed;
,
[11] In denial of anysucnplan, the appellant insists th~t
the a:f6.davitsand al~o the notice to tenants of'Ma:rch 30th ,re"
cei~ed in e~dence aremadmissible against' her 'because ,they
were ()btai~edbyTaylor for his benefit while acting ,as '~t·
torney. for her. The confi,dential relationShip of attorney
andciient, Mrs. Ma.rlenee. a~ert!!, raises' a ,pr,esumption of
lack of consideration ,ilnduridlleinfluerice which was. notrebutted (sec. 2235,' Civ.Code.) . Itowever, ,assUIning that,' the
statementS
fact con:cerningth~ sale to Gaston are an "a4vantage'; obtained by Taylor, as attorney, which may' be
qneliltioned in an action' between: the client 'and asucce~or
in titl~" of the attorney, ,there is ample evidence, in the
record to support the implied 'finding of the trial court that
they were not obtained by any undue influence. The same
may be said of the notIce to tenants. Certainly from th~
evidence before it, the trial court was entirely justified in
concluding that the appeUantwas thoroughly conversant with
every move made by Taylol' in connection with the property and that she fully 'agreed upon the method used in
conveying title to the respondents.
[12] The appellant complains oUhe trial court's failure to
determine the issue, of the asserted fraud perpetrated upon
her by Taylor. But"itdid find 'that if there was such fraud,
ther~spondent<l had no knowledge of it and are not affected
thereby. Another finding' is that they are bona fide pur.
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cha:sersi which compels a judgment in favor of. the,respondelrts, hence aily determination of the iS$ueQf fraud 88
between the appellant 'and Taylor Was immat~:tial; and Un.;
J1eeessary; (RUSsell v. RiZey& Peterson, 82 CaLApp.'728
[256~;557].)
,
"
,,'
',[13J It is also asserted that the trial judge e':rrQneously,ad- .
mitted mto evide;nce, over· objection, aPllrPorte4, as$i~trleilt
ofMi-s: Madenee's' dililtributive share 'itt. the~taie~fher
deceased husband, and that she was not aHowed to testifY'
as to when, how,and' for whatpurpo$¢, she placed her signa..:.
ture Upon it. '.As no, finding was made' .conee.rning this
'instrument, and the C\ourt did not conclude thatthere$ponde~ts ,pave any title because of it, the rUlings, have notpreju~,
dIced the appellant.
'
.,' ,
'The judgment is affirmed.

, :;1

.If

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J:"Traynor,J.,
,and Peters,J., pro tem., concurred.
.
,
'.

"Appellant's petition for a rehearmg was denied March 29,
1943.
"
,

[L~A. No. 18263.

In Bank. Mar. 1,1943.]

MARIAN VALLERA, Respondent, v. CONCEZIO VAL~
LERA, Appellant.
[1] Marriage-Void Marriage~lncidents.-A woman who 'lives,

with a man as his wue in the belief that a valid marriage exists
is entitled, upon termination of their relationship, to share in,

the p.rop~r.ty acql,lired by them during itS existence, The prop;erty IS dIVIded as community,property would be upon a divorce,
irrespective of the proportionate contributions of each.
'. [2] Id.-Void Marriages-Incidents-Belief._The essential basis
of a putative marriage is a belief of the existenceof'a valid
marriage. Such belief in good faith is lacking wherethu, per-

by persons liVing in
See, also, 16 Cal.Jur~ 926;

[l]Ri~htsrespecting property' accumulated

,~licitrelations, notei 75 A.L.R. 732.

35 Am.Jur. 214.

'

McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Marriage, § 22; [5] Aliensl § 26.

,
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son claiming such belief knows at the beginning of her relationshipwith a man that he is married, and this, even though
the marriage is dissolved during the continuan<\eof the relationship where neither party is aware of the dissolution.

I
"

[3] ld. - Void Marriages-Incidents-Belief.-A woman living
with a man as' his wife but with no genuine belief that she is
legally married to him does not acquire by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of a cotenant in his earnings and accumulations during the period of their relationship.
[4] Id.-VoidMarriages-lncidents-Agreement as to Property.If a man and woman live together as husband and wife under
an agreement to pool their earnings and share' equally in their
joint 'accumlliations, equity will protect the interests of' each
in said pr()perty. Even in the absence. of an express agreement
to that effect, the woman would be entitled to share in property jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds contributed toward its acquisition.
[5] Aliens-Rights~Defense of Action.-A person convicted of
falsely repre!enting his citizenship is not precluded from challenging. a court's jurisdiction over his property.

APPEAL from part of a judgment of the Superior Court
. of Los Angeles County. Thomas C. Gould, Judge. Reversed.
Action for separate maintenance and division of comm1.lUity
property. Part of judgment adjudging ownership of property
in cotenancy; affirmed.
Zagon. & Aaron, S. S. Zagon and L. B. Minter for Appellant.
William Ellis Lady for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.~Plaintiff brought this action for separate
maintenance and for a division of community property, which
she alleged was worth at least $60,000. She relied' on an
alleged .common law marriage contracted in Michigan on
December 16, 1938, and accused defendant of extreme cruelty,
desertion, and adultery. Defendant denied the allegations
of the complaint and alleged that his relations with plaintiff
were illicit and that he wa.s legally married to Lido Cappello,
named as co-respondent in the complaint. The trial court
found, that plaintiff and defendant did not on December' 16,
i938, or at any other time contract a common law marriage
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in Michigan or elsewhere; that they did riot at any time enter
into or attempt to enter into an agreement to take eaph
other as husband and wife; that beginning in May, 1936, and
for at least three years thereafter, plaintiff cohabited meretriciously with defendant; that between January, 1933, and
December 15, 1938, defendant was married to Ethel Chippo
Vallera; that plaintiff knew from the beginning of her relationship with defendant that he was married and under II
legal disability to enter into a marriage contract with her ;
that while the marriage between defendant and Ethel Chippo
Vail era was dissolved on December 15, 1938, neither plaintiff
nor defendant learned of its dissolution until November,
1939; and that on July .6, 1940, defendant entered into a
valid marriage with Lido Cappello. The court concluded that
plaintiff and defendant had never been husband· sndwife ;
that plaintiff Wa.'3 not entitled to maintenance; and that there
was no community property. It held, however, that all property acquired by the parties between December Hi, 1938;
and July 6, 1940, except such property as either might have
acquired by gift, devise, bequest, or descent, was held by them
as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half
thereof, and defendant has appealed. from this part of the
judgment. He contends that since there was no marriage,
no attempt to contract marriage, no belief in the existence of
a valid marriage; no evidence of any agreement between the
parties as to their property rights, and no evidence concerning the accumulation of property or contributions by the
parties thereto, plaintiff could not acquire the rights of a cotenant in property acquired by him during the period of
illicit cohabitation.
[1] It is well settled that a woman who lives With a man
as his wife in the belief that a valid marriage exists, is entitled
upon termination of their relationship to share in the prop~
erty acquired by them during its existence. (Feig v. Bank
of Italy etc. Assn., 218 Cal. 54 [21. P.2d 421]; Figoni v.
Figoni, 211 Cal. 354 [295 P. 339]; Schneider v. Schneider,
183 Cal. 335 [191 P. 533, 11 A.L.R. 1386]; Ooats v. Ooats,
160 Cal. 671 [118 P; 441, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 844] ; see 11 A.L.R.
1394.) The proportionate contribution of each party to the
property is immaterial in this state (Ooats v. Ooats, supra;
Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 Cal.App. 98 [201 P. 143]), for the
property is divided as community property wonld be upon

.
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the dissolution ofa valid marriage. (Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Ca1.2d 95 [69 P.2d' 845, 111 A.L,R. 342] ;lJ'eig
Bank of Ameri~a etc. Assn., 5 Ca1.2d 266 [54 P .2d 3J·;
Schneider v. Schneider, supra; Ooats v. Ooats, supra; Macch.i
v.LaRocca, supra.)
[2] The essential basis of a 'putative marriage, however,
is belief in the existence of a valid marriage. (Flanagan
v. Oapital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307] ; see Evans;
Property Interests Arising from Q1~asi-Jfarital Relations, 9
Corn.hQ. 246; 20 ClI,l.L.Rev.453:) In addition, in the majorityof cases, the de facto wife attempted to meet the re~uisit~$
of a, valid, marriage, .and' the' ~arriage prOved invalId only
because of som,eessential fact of,which she was uriaware,such,
the' earlier.undissolvedmartiage of orie of the partieS
(Schneider~. Schneider, supra; Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash.
110 [176 P.22, 11 A.L.R. 1391]), a consangUineous relatfon
between the pax:ties (Figoni ~. 1J'igo'fl,i, supra; K tauter' v.
Krauter~ 79 Okla. 30 [190P.I088)), ,01' the failure tomeet
the requirement of solemnization. (Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal",
App.2d 62 [89P.2d 16~] i:Ma~chi Y. La'Rocca, supra; see
,Fung l)ai KimAh L.eong Lau A.h Leong, 27 F.2d 582.) , '
Although it is clear from the' trial court's findings that the
parties inthe present casedrd not comply with the requisites
of a legal marriage, pla~ntiff contends that the presumption
that a person is innocent of crime or wrong (Code- Civ•.
Proc. § 1963, subd.l); and the fact that tlie parties lived
together as man and wife at a'time when both were free to
enter into a valid marriage with one another, establis,hes that
plaintiffbeIieved in good faith that she was the lawful wife
of defendan,t. The findings of the trial court, however,amply
supported by the evidence,do not substantiate the existence
'of good faith. (See Fla'rtagan v. OapitaZ Nat. Bank, supra.)
The removal of the harrier to a valid marria.ge between the
parties by the dissolution of defendant's marriage to Ethel
Chippo Vallera does 'not substantiate plaintiff's good faith,
for the court found that neither plaintiff nor defendant was
aware of that dissolution. [3] The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether a woman living with a man as
his wife but with no genuine belief that she is legally married
to him acquires by reason of, cohabitation alone the rights of
a' co·tenaJ;lt in his earnings· and accumulations during the
period of their relatiormhip. It. has already bepl1 answered in
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the negative.. (Flanaganv. OapitalNat. Bank.,

213Ca~.

664.

[3 P.2d 307].) Equitable considerations arisiI),g from, 'the
reasonable expectation of thecontinu~tion of benefits attend..
ing the status of marriage entered into' hi good falthare not
present in such ,a ,ca!)e.
'[4] Plaintiff's lack of ,good faith in alleging the' belief
thai she had entered into a validinarriage would not, however, 'preclude her from recovering' pr,ope,rty to whi~h"she
would otherwise be entitled. If a man' and woman lIve to- '
getherashu/!!band and wife under an agreement to' poolthei,r
earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations'
equitywUl protect the interests 'of each in Stich l>roperty..
(Bacon v. Ba,con, 21 Cal.App,2d 540 [69P.2d~~41; lIfitchell
.v. Fisk, 97 Ark. 444 [134 P. 940, 36L;RA.;'N~S:~3S1;" s~~
Fetg, v. Bank of America etc. A,ssn;, supr.ar1Jt'fu}k~n,';Y"
Bracken,£>2 S.D. 252, 256 '[217 RW. 192]; llayworlh v:.'
Williams,102 Tex. 308 [116 S.W.43, 132 AinJ3i;Rep. 879)~)
Even in the absence of ail ~Aipi'ess agreement ~o ':that ',eftect,
the woman would be entitled"to, share in the 'property ,j"oiiltlr
accumulated, in the :r;>ro:r;>ortion that herfimdscontributed
toward its acquisition. (Hayworth v. Williams, supra; Delamou~ v. Roger, 7 La.Ann. 152.) There isni:) e-riden,ce tha.t the
the present caSe ',made any agreezneli~ 'cotlce'rning
'parties
their property' or property, rights. ,The meagei" ,evidence with
respect" tathe accumulation, of 'the alleged community property ~an support only the, infer~nce that the property consisted 'of defendant's earnings during the periodfu questiOn"
and there is no contention' to i,he contrary. There :1s,
thus no support in the record for the tria1 court's finding
that the parties each 0wn~d an undivide.d, one·halfofthe
property. acquired by either of them betw~en December 16,
1938, and' July 5, 1940.
'
'[5] There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that defendant is not in a position to challenge the trialc~ur1/S ruIiitg because he stands convicted in the District Court of the
Uriited$tates 6f falsely representing himself to, be an American .citizen.
The part of, the jUdgment appealed from is reversed.

in

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
CURTIS,J.-ldissent. I,agree with the conclusion of the
maj<orityopinioniit. holding· that the .judgmeilt of the trial
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court cannot be sustained 'upon the ground that (1) there
was a valid marriage, (2) an attempt to contract a valid marriage, (3). a bona fide belief in the existence or. a validma:-.
riage,or (4) an express agreement of the p~rtIes as tot~eIr
property rights. I disagree with the concluSlOnof the maJ~r"
ityopinion thatin order to sustain ~he judgment of t~e t~Ial
court there must be proof of a definIte monetary cQntrIbll~lOn
'by the plaintiff in the form of separate property, or a contrIbu~
tion of her earnings as a waitress or from other employment
outside the, home. In the absence of any proof of any cash
or, property, contribution by the plaintiff" the holding of the
trial court that she owned a one-half interest in the prope,rty
accumulated must have been based upon the conclusion that
the value of her services as a housekeeper, cook, and homemaker was of sufficient value to warrant an equal division of
the property. The majority opinion substitutes its ownappraisal of the value of her services in the home as being of
no more value than the, cost of maintenance of herself and
her two' children. The holding of the trial court seemS to
me more reasonable.
The exiStence of the illicit relationship even knowingly
entered into, is no bar per se to an equitable division of the
property. This is demonstrated by the cases cite~ in the
majority opinion which hold that if there is an express agreement to pool property, or if the woman's earnings co:ntribute
to its purchase, the eXistence of the illicit rela.tionship; ~~en
knowingly entered into, does not, bar an eqUItable dIVISIon
of the property. This state has determined as part of its
fundamental public policy that a wife has a one-half interest
in marital property. The same rule, by analogy, is applied
where the parties enter into an illicit relationship butthin~~
in good faith, they are married. The next step was taken In
those caSes which hold that express agreements to' share
equally in joint accumulations will, be enforced, and the court
will protectthe interest of both where both contribute toward
the purchase of the property, even though they, both knew the
relation was illicit. LikeWise, if an express agreement will be
enforced, th,ere is no legal, or just reason, why an implied agreemEmt to share the property cannot be enforced. Unless it can
be argued that a woman's services as cook, housekeeper, and
homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical that if, when
she contributes money to the purchase of property. her inter,est will be protected, then when she contributes her services
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1

in the home, her interest in property accumulated should be
. protected. Just because the man, who in the instant case was
equally guilty, earned the money to buy the property, should
not bar the woman from any rights at an in the property,
although her services made the acquisition possible. Such a
rule gives all the advantages to be gained from such a relationship to the man with no burdens.
The majority opinion concedes that in determining the
value of a woman's services in maintaining a home the courts
have held, in instances involving the absence of a valid marriage but the existenM of a bona fide belief in the existence
of a marriage, that upon the termination of the relation, the
property will be divided as community, property would be
upon the dissolution of a valid marriage and that the proportionate contribution of each party to the purchase of the property is immaterial. (Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 CaLApp. 98 [201
P. 143].) Unless the underlying purpose be to punish the
woman for participating in the illicit relationship-which
idea of punishment obviously has no just place in a controversy between two parties equally guilty-why should not
the same rule be applied to the instant case'
It should perhaps be noted that the trial court limited the
recovery by the plaintiff to a half-interest in the property
acquired during the period the parties cohabited subsequent to the divorce of the first wife and prior to defendant's marriage to his second wife, hence no equities of third
parties intervene, and the only question involved is that of
the equities between the parties. To permit the defendant
to retain the entire fruits of their joint efforts is contrary to
the dictates of simple justice.
i

i

I
I

I
I

Carter, J., and Peters, J. pro tem., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 29,
1943. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a hearing.
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